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ShareholderApprobation of Board and Performance of Public Traded
Corporations
—Evidence from the Canadian market
Yu Cao
This study empirically tests the hypothesis that boards with higher shareholder
confidence level can significantly improve corporate financial performance. The
hypothesis is tested by examining the relationship between operating earnings in excess
of the cost of capital (Excess Return) for a sample of 196 large publicly traded Canadian
firms from 2002-2006, A notable and significant positive relationship exists between
Excess Return and the shareholders' evaluation of board performance. High shareholder
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The corporate form has consistently proven to be a superior method of business
organization. Great industrial economies have grown and prospered where the
corporate legal structure has been prevalent. However, multiple problems arising out
of the fundamental agency nature of the corporate relationship have continually
hindered its complete economic effectiveness. Where ownership and management are
structurally separated, how does one assure effective operational efficiencies? The
traditional solution laid in the establishment of a powerful monitoring
intermediary—the board of directors-whose primary responsibility was management
oversight and control for the benefit of the residual equity owners.
The establishment of board of director theoretically should result in the increase in
shareholder value and management efficiency, but in reality this hypothesis does not
hold in all cases. Started from the early 201 century, professional managers have
become major players in the management of large corporations. Through control of
the proxy process, incumbent management nominated its own candidates for board
membership. The board of directors, theoretically composed of the representatives of
various shareholding groups, instead was comprised of individuals selected by
management. Therefore, the board can actually be the instrument of management in
pursuing for their own interest. For example, large corporations like GM, IBM and
Sears had reported more than $32 billion loses in 1992 due to inefficient corporate
governance (MacAvoy & Millstein 1998). In 2001 Enron scandal led to the
bankruptcy of the largest American company in history. For years, in order to
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maximize their performance related compensation, Enron management significantly
exaggerated company earnings by utilizing special accounting method and
manipulating accounting data. However, Enron's board of director did not pay enough
attention to the highly risky accounting method and took no action on risk
management. Here, the lesson we can learn is to achieve high performance and stable
growth, corporations should enhance corporate governance; especially an effective
board of directors should exists to monitor and adjust management operational
activities.
In the last several decades, studies on the relationship between board performance and
corporate performance have become popular in corporate governance area. While
most studies focus on specific topics like: 1 . Board composition —usually in terms of
the ratio of inside (executive) directors to outside (non-executive) directors (Fama
1980 and Fama and Jensen 1983; Johnson et al., 1996; Dalton et al., 1999; Dalton et
al., 2003) 2. Board dynamics - suggest that board should collaborate at group level
(Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Langevoort, 2001; Conger et al., 2001; Sherwin, 2003;
Cascio, 2004) 3. The role of Board — role that individual board directors play in
contributing to board effectiveness, in term of attitudes, skills and behaviors of the
individual directors (Bowman and Kakabadse, 1997; Renton, 1999; Shen 2005;
Roberts et al. 's 2005). However, since it is very difficult to observe what happens in
the board room, few studies explored this relationship by using a comprehensive and
practical evaluation of board activism. In 1994, GM issued its guide lines for the
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evaluation of active board. The key provisions included board composition,
responsibilities and behavior of independent board members, self-evaluation, CEO
evaluation combined with performance of business, etc. In 1995 CaIPERS conducted
a survey using the GM guide line to evaluate board performance of 300 largest US
public companies and assigned grades ranging from "A+" to "F" to each company.
Based on this result, Millstein and MacAvay (1998) tested and demonstrated the
significant positive relationship between the level of board activism and corporation
financial performance.
We seek to contribute to this line of research by looking, for the first time at the
evidence for Canadian data and test the robustness of previous findings in the
literature. The difference between our study and previous literature is in stead ofusing
board effectiveness; we look from another angle to see shareholders' approbation of
the board. We used Board Shareholder Confidence Index (conducted by Rotman
School of Business of University of Toronto) to show shareholder's evaluation of
board performance and TSE 300 corporate financial data as performance
measurement. We tested the null hypothesis that there is no statistically significant
relationship between shareholder's confidence level of board performance and
corporate financial performance. The test covered the year from 2002 to 2006. The
result of our study concluded that among all variables in the model, only data for
shareholder confidence level showed significant positive relationship with corporate
performance at both group and individual level.
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The organization of the paper is as follows. In section II, a brief review of the
literature is provided. Section ?? describes the methodology for the tests as well as
the data used in the analyses. Empirical results follow in section IV. The paper
concludes with a summary in Section V.
II. LITERATUREREVIEW
A corporation should have at least one director elected by shareholders. The boards
are expected and trusted to conduct the corporation's business in a way that will
preserve and enhance the shareholders' investment. Directors are responsible for
supervising the activities of the corporation and for making decisions regarding those
activities. (Canada Business Corporations Act) . For decades, board members have
done so by giving managers the authority to run daily operations of the business, to
make decisions that incur risks and to respond to changes in the business environment,
while monitoring and evaluating management performance, making strategic
decisions about the development of the corporation. However, as the separation of
corporate ownership and management control occurred during the mid-twentieth
century, professional managers with notable leadership and experience began to
dominate the boards of directors in addition to their daily operation duties. The
consequence of this change was that the management would have the ability to
affluence the composition of the board. Some board members were chosen by
management from among its own ranks of large-company executives and from among
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its professional associates in the law and finance (Adolph Berle & Gardiner Means
1932, Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. 1977, James Gillies 1992)
The arm-length relationship implied in the board's monitoring role over management
was replaced by a collégial relationship between the two (Robert A.G Monks & Nell
Minow 1991, Robert A.G. Monks & Nell Minow 1996, Jay W. Lorsch & Elizabeth
Maclver 1989). This impaired the board's function of overseeing the management
performance. It also facilitated the development of the agency problem that
management tried to maximize its own interest at the cost of the shareholder's interest
and overall value of the company. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, many
managements controlling large corporations invested in low-return growth and
diversification to expand corporation size and scope for their own personal interests;
as a result, these companies experienced significant drops in profits and market values.
In 1992 alone, large public traded corporations such as IBM, GM and Sears together
reported a total loss of $32.4 billion in market values. Low level returns led to greater
pressure on board members from various shareholders and investors to pursue then-
duties actively and seriously.
Early studies have tried to find the solution to overcome the agency problem and
restore board efficiency, most of which focus on the composition of the board. Fama
(1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest that it is natural for the most influential
members of the board to be the internal managers, due to their valuable, specific
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information about the organization's activities obtained from internal mutual
monitoring of other managers. Such information assists the board and becomes an
effective device for decision control. However, Williamson (1984) notes that because
managers have huge informational advantages due to their full-time status and insider
knowledge, the board of director can easily become an instrument of management,
thereby sacrificing the interests of stockholders. Domination by top management on
the board of director can lead to collusion and a transfer of stockholder wealth (Fama
1980). As a result, corporate boards generally include outside members who act as
arbiters in disagreements among internal managers and ratify decisions that involve
serious agency problems (Fama and Jensen 1983). The findings of Rosenstein and
Wyatt (1990) suggest that stockholders value the incorporation of outside directors on
boards as evidenced by a positive, abnormal stock return when outside directors are
added to boards.
In practice, during the last several decades, the revolution of boards from passive and
dependent to active and independent monitors revealed the effort to address or avoid
serious performance problems associated with managerial entrenchment. Many large
public corporations began to have new, independent members who were selected _in
consultation with management by a wholly independent board committee such as the
'nomination' or 'governance' committee. Bhagat and Black (1999) showed that
according to a 1997 survey of 484 S&P 500 firms, over half (56%) of the surveyed
firms had only one or two inside directors, only nine firms (2%) had a majority of
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inside directors, and the median firm had over 80% ofoutside directors.
In addition to board composition, multiple theories have been adopted to explain and
predict how boards affect company performance, including agency ( Jensen and
Meckling, 1976), social network (Granovetter, 1985), stewardship (Davis et al., 1997),
institutional (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) and resource dependence (Pfeffer and
Salancik, 1978). Thus far, management researchers have learned a great deal
regarding the relationship between board composition, reward structures, board
practices, and firm performance using the data available from corporate proxy
statements and other archival sources (Finegold et al., 2007; Finkelstein, 1992).
Although there is a growing literature linking corporate governance to company
performance there is, equally, a growing diversity of results. The diversity of results
can be partly explained by differences in the theoretical perspectives applied, selected
research methodologies, measurement ofperformance and conflicting views on board
involvement in decision making and, in part, to the contextual nature of the individual
firm. Even studies based on the integrative models of board involvement,
incorporating different theoretical perspectives and various board attributes, provide
inconclusive results, suggesting that corporate governance has, at least, an indirect
effect on company performance (Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Jonnergard and Svensson,
1995; Maassen, 1999).
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A prevailing problem among almost all those studies is the limited knowledge of how
boards function as a group because it is quite difficult for researchers to access what
takes place within boardrooms (Daily et al., 2003). Board members are reluctant to
share information about the inner dynamics of boards for many reasons. Primarily,
directors fear that revealing boardroom activities, or even just rating the effectiveness
of the board, could have adverse effects on relationships with investors and other
board members (Kesner and Johnson, 1990). Furthermore, there are concerns that
exposure to internal practices could increase the risk of shareholder lawsuits should
troubles emerge (Langevoort, 2001). Therefore, the extreme sensitivity of the
financial and strategic information discussed in the boardroom has precluded
observational studies of boards, while the threat of lawsuits and respect for the
privacy of fellow directors has tended to limit detailed information on boardroom
operations and practices. Due to this, researches have treated the corporate boardroom
as a theoretical 'black box' (Daily et al., 2003; Leblanc, 2004).
Since it is not easy to directly observe board's activity, alternative information that
can reflect board's activity and can be easily obtained was used among both
researchers and large companies. In the spring of 1994, GM board issued guidelines
setting forth procedures designed to ensure that it or any other currently independent
board would actively monitor management. Due to GM's status as one of the largest
companies in the world at the time, this guideline was adopted by many organizations
when setup their own corporate governance evaluation systems. Based on this
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guideline, CaIPERS conducted a survey among 300 largest public U.S. companies to
evaluate their board performance. In May 1995, CaIPERS published the result of the
survey and assigned a grade, from "A+" to "F" to each company based on their
response. Later on, MacAvoy and Millstein (1998) concluded that according to the
CaIPERS survey data, there existed a significant relationship between board
governance and corporate financial performance.
While many similar studies have been conducted, the majority of such studies is based
on U.S. company data. In the spring of 2003, the Canadian Board Shareholder
Confidence Index was conducted by Clarkson Centre for Business Ethics and Board
Effectiveness (CC(BE)2) at Rotman School of Business ofUniversity of Toronto. This
index indicates board performance of companies listed on the S&P/TSX Composite
Index. Because of difficulties to record the board behavior in the board room, the
index captures many factors affecting shareholders' confidence in the Boards' abilities
to fulfill their duties. Based on factors available to those outside the walls of the
boardroom, they evaluate and rank Boards of Directors by their potential to act
efficiently and by their performance, as indicated by past practices. In the end, an
overall score from AAA+ [highest] to C [lowest] is assigned to each company. Key
factors include: (1) Individual Directors must be able to act independently from the
interests of management, and independently from the other Directors. A director
should have stock ownership in the company in that he/she can be motivated to act in
the best interest of the shareholders. (2) Separation of CEO and Chair position should
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be encouraged; the audit and compensation committee should be fully independent.
Voting rights between different share classes should follow a proper ratio. (3) Certain
past practices should be considered as having negative effects on board performance
such as option re-pricing, excessive option granting, taking a company pension plan,
and having outstanding loans from the company.
CC(BE)2 score provide an easy and effective method for evaluating the board
performance of Canadian companies. However, since it is based on shareholders'
perception but not actual board behavior, further analysis on empirical evidence from
attempts to prove or disprove the linkage should be conducted.
??. METHODOLOGYAND sample generation
A. Metricsfor Shareholders 'Confidence ofBoards
The board of director's responsibilities includes participating in strategic planning,
incentivizing and monitoring management performance, and negatively rewarding, in
a timely manner, failing managers. The major barrier of measuring the effectiveness
and efficiency of board of directors is that we can not observe and record their
behavior in the board room. Most boardrooms are closed and reluctant to disclose
information to the public completely. Therefore, we have to develop alternative
approaches based on public information as the agency for indentifying professional
boards.
Started in Spring 2003, Clarkson center for business ethics and board effectiveness
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( CC(BE2) ) at Rotman School of Business of University ofToronto introduced Board
Shareholder Confidence Index, compromised of factors often used by active
shareholders to assess Board of Directors. Instead of information that can only be
observed within the boardroom, this study captures many factors affecting
shareholders' confidence in the Boards' abilities to fulfill their duties. These factors
are different from the TSX Guidelines for effective corporate governance in that they
take into account the shareholders' perception of risk. Based on factors available to
those outside the walls of the boardroom, we can evaluate and rank Boards of
Directors by their potential to act in an effective way and by their performance, as
indicated by past practices. The result is a transparent, objective, and adaptable rating
system that assigns companies listed on the S&P/TSX Composite Index an overall
score from AAA+ [highest] to C [lowest]. The score is derived from the consideration




Each perspective is described by several specific items and a base score is assigned to
each of-them to indicate the perfect scenario. A deduction is made from the base score
of certain items if the fact related to it is considered to have a negative effect on board
performance according to the CC(BE)2 standard. The highest total score for a
company is 100, which indicates that no deduction was made on any aspect of board
performance. Next we examine the details of each of the three perspectives.
H
1. Individual Potential:
In order for shareholders' interests to be folly represented by the Board of
Directors, individual Directors must be able to act independently from the
interests of management, and independently from the other Directors. Stock
ownership indicates that a director is aligned to other shareholders and motivated
to improve the company's performance. Individual Potential is comprised of these
two factors: Director Independence, and Director Stock Ownership.
1.1. Director Independence
1.1.1. Independence
Director Independence measures the independence of individual
directors from each other, as well as from company management.
Relationships with management increase the potential risk that the
director will act in the interests of executives before those of the
shareholder. If any of the following apply to a director she/he is
considered related to management:
- Employee of the company (currently or within three years).
- Executive of any affiliated company
- Director or director's firm provides legal, auditing, or consulting
services to the company (within the last 3 years).
- Kinship to CEO or Chair (if Chair holds >10% of company's
shares).
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- Any other significant relationship deemed material by CC(BE)2
that does not fall under the above categories.
At least two-thirds of the board must be independent from
management, or else a deduction is made. The deduction increases as
the proportion ofrelated directors increases.
1.1.2. Interlocks
It is also important that relationships between directors be kept under
control. If the same two directors sit on more than one board together,
there is a perceived risk that decisions are being made in the interests
of another company, known as a director interlock. A deduction is
made if there is more than one director interlock present on a Board.
1.1.3. Excessive Board Memberships
In order to perform effectively, a Director must not have too many
obligations beyond her/his duties on the Board. A Company receives a
deduction for every Director that is a member of more than five
S&P/TSX Boards.
1.2. Stock Ownership
A director, however independent and experienced, needs to be motivated to
act in the best interest of the shareholders. Motivation is measured as a
function of a director's stock ownership in the company.
The calculation is based on the average value of stock owned by the third
of the board with the fewest shares, compared to the value of the directors'
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annual retainer. Annual retainer figures include the value of any annual
deferred share unit grants, which are valued using the company's year-end
share price if a grant date is not given. Directors with less than three years'
tenure on the Board are not included in this calculation.
$(AVERAGE SHARE OWNERSHIP OF BOTTOM
m _ THIRD OF DIRECTORS)STOCK OWNERSHIP MULTIPLE = '
S(ANNUAL RETAINER)
A deduction is made if the multiple is less than four; the graduated
deduction increases as the multiple decreases.
2. Group Potential:
Group Potential represents the potential for the board as a whole to best represent
the interests of shareholders, without compromising the Individual Potential of
the directors. The factors determining Group Potential are Board Meeting
Structure, and the implementation of Board Evaluation Processes.
2.1. Structure
A company's score in this category is based on the characteristics of its
board meeting structure. The structure of a board and its meetings can
either encourage or impede the Individual Potential of its directors, as well
as affecting the board's output. Structural measurements include:
1) The separation of CEO and Chair positions
If the CEO and Chair positions are not separated, the perceived
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potential for the Board to operate independently from the influence
ofmanagement is decreased. A deduction is made if the positions are
not fully separated. A smaller deduction is given to companies with
no appointed an Independent Lead Director to lead board meetings;
or to companies that have split the CEO and Chair positions, but the
Chair is related.
2) Independence ofAudit and Compensation Committee members
Full-independence of a company's committees is necessary in order
to ensure that executive compensation and company accounting are
handled without conflict of interest between Management and
shareholders.
In order to avoid deductions here, every member of the Audit and
Compensation Committees must be fully independent. This means
that if any director considered dependent in the Director
Independence section sits on either of these committees, the
company receives a deduction.
NOTE: EXECUTIVES OF THE PARENT COMPANY ARE CONSIDERED UNRELATED ON THE
COMPENSATION COMMITTEE.
If a Compensation Committee interlock exists between executives of
two or more companies, the involved directors are considered
related with respect to all interlocked Compensation Committees.
This is to avoid situations where executives from different
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companies are determining each other's salaries.
There are additional restrictions placed on committee membership:
deductions are also made if any Related-Independent Directors sit
on the Audit or Compensation Committees. The criteria for
Related-Independence include:
- Non-Management major shareholder (>30% votes) of
company of interest.
- Kinship to non^-management major shareholder of company of
interest.
If related directors sit on both the Audit and Compensation
Committees, separate deductions are made for each respective
committee.
3) The ratio ofvoting rights to share ownership between share classes.
Many companies have several classes of shares, and often the
different classes are not allowed equal voting rights. An imbalance
of voting rights often means that influence toward Board decisions is





Votes per Share Shares Outstanding
10,000
5,000,000
In this case, all of the company's voting rights associated with a
small minority of the outstanding shares. Often, these shares are held
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by company executives, thus not allowing any voting power to the
majority of shareholders.
Deductions in this area are graduated; as the disproportion between
shares and voting rights increases, so does the deduction made. No
deduction is made for companies with multiple share classes if every
class is allowed the same number ofvotes per share.
2.2. Systems (Evaluations)
In order to receive a perfect score in this category, a company must
implement regular and formal evaluation processes for both the board as a
whole, and each of its individual directors. Scoring is based on disclosure
of details regarding the evaluation processes. In other words, if evaluations
are mentioned, but no details are given, a deduction is still made.
3. Past Practices:
The past practices of a board are assessed by evaluating the results of their
decisions. Scoring is based on practices that investor surveys generally regard as
being opposed to the best interests of shareholders, including:
- Excessive option grants, and/or dilution
Dilution occurs when options granted to executives and directors make up
a significant proportion of the outstanding shares, thus diluting returns
that would otherwise go to shareholders. A deduction is made if options
comprise greater than 10% of a company's outstanding shares. A
deduction is also made if options granted to the CEO comprise greater
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than 5% of a company's outstanding shares. Both of the above are
thresholds set by the TSX.
- Option re-pricing
When a company's share performance has suffered, the cost of exercising
stock options can be greater than the cost of purchasing stock at market
value. In such a case, a company may decide to lower the exercise price in
order to align it with the market value of the stock. Option re-pricing is
perceived as relieving directors of their responsibility for the company's
performance. A deduction is made if a company has re-priced their
options within the last three years.
- CEO compensation significantly UP while share price significantly
DOWN
Determination of CEO compensation is a responsibility of the Board of
Directors. In order to best represent the interests of the company's
shareholders, the compensation of the CEO should be associated with the
company's performance. A deduction is made here if a CEO's total
compensation increases by more than 25% following a year during which
the company's share price decreased by more than 25%. There is a
cooling-off period of 3 years before this deduction is removed from a
company's score.
- Director Pensions
Some boards offer pension plans to their directors, which can be seen as
18
creating an unnecessary tie between the directors and the corporation.
Director pensions increase the likelihood that a conflict of interest will
compromise the directors' responsibilities to shareholders.
- Outstanding loans to directors or executives
Although most companies have discontinued the granting of loans to then-
directors and executives, many still have outstanding loans on the books,
and some still have yet to discontinue granting loans. Loans to employees
can be seen as an inappropriate use of shareholder money.
- Evergreen option plans
Many companies are now introducing evergreen option plans, where the
maximum number of options approved for issue is a percentage of
outstanding shares, instead of a specific number. Generally, shareholder
approval must be sought in order to replenish the option plan once a
specific number of options have been issued. Evergreen plans allow
companies to continue granting options in any amount up to a certain
percentage dilution. This takes authority away from shareholders, while
increasing the possibility of higher dilution.
Total Scores
Each company begins with 100 points from which Individual Potential, Group










B. Metricsfor Corporate Performance
A variety ofmeasurements have been used to analyze corporate performance based on
criteria such as production and allocative efficiency, progress, full employment, and
equity (RM. Scherer & David Ross 1990). Measurement that focuses on goals of
investors and access of capital to companies include revenue, earnings, and return to
investors. Measurements focus on shareholder returns include earnings per share,
earnings growth, discounted future earnings, and economic value added (EVA).
Among these popular measurements we choose the last one as our measure of
corporate performance because Economic Value Added provides a metric for a
company's ability to "generate economic profits, and thereby create wealth for
shareholders." (Laura Walbert 1995). EVA is the residual after the cost of capital has
been subtracted from returns on the relevant investment (Irwin Ross 1997).
Therefore, EVA is also defined as excess return (ER) which is used in many studies. A
company can add value to shareholders' wealth if it generates a positive excess return
(ER); or hurt shareholders' wealth if it delivers a negative ER.
One of the major advantages of excess return (ER) measurement is that it relies on the
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assumption that "the prime financial objective of any company ought to be to
maximize the wealth of the shareholders." It is also straightforward, easy to apply to
corporations at different stages of growth. (G. Bennett Stewart III 1994). Furthermore,
ER provides a breakeven return on investment which will cover opportunity cost of
this investment (from investor's view of point) or indicate a cost of equity (from
shareholder's view ofpoint) (Timothy J. Sheehan 1994).
The limitation of ER is that it is based on historical but not current financial data. It
can be significantly different from the current stock return, which is a preferred
measure to shareholders. However, some theories argue that the current stock price is
equal to the present value of a stream of future residue cash flows which are measured
by ER (Thomas E. Copeland & J. Fred Weston 1998, William F. Sharpe et al. 1995).
In addition, to calculate the present values many factor about the company and state
of economy have to be predicted (Alfred Rappaport 1986). Thus, stock price would
only reflect speculative expectations of future decisions. Theory holds that excess
returns only explain less than half of the variance in share value among companies;
the rest has to depend on shareholder expectations about future prospects (Cf. Rawley
Thomas 1993). Also, since ER measures what the company and its management
have accomplished in the past, the result is more objective and free from outside
factors that could affect stock price but are not controlled by companies. Therefore, to
measure current managerial performance, ER is better than stock price return.
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The major problem with EVA (or ER) is the calculation of cost of capital. For
companies who have multiple business units whose costs and profits are interrelated,
the calculation for cost of capital is very complex and often inaccurate. However, this
problem occurs to any performance measure that utilizes cost of capital or tries to
measure cost ofperformance in dollar values.
Finally, by using excess return measure we assume that corporations try to improve
performance by maximizing earning returns on their costs of capital. Therefore,
although theories suggest that the long term success of corporations are also affected
by factors such as benefits received by customer, employees, supplier of labor,
technology, capital and etc, in our study, we assume that residual earnings or excess
return maximization is the pure measurement for corporate performance and good
corporate governance should drive management to increase excess returns to
shareholders. Of course, how to efficiently allocate this return to shareholders is the
subsequent task for the governance, but that is not addressed in this research.
The calculation of ER is to subtract a company's cost of capital (including both equity
and debt) from the net operation income after tax. The result is a dollar excess return.
For example, if a company's cost of capital is $50 million, and after tax operational
profit is $100 million, then the ER would be $50 million. However, this method has a
limitation in that it is difficult to compare two company's performance by comparing
the ER in dollar amount. A large corporation can generate a relatively big ER return
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than that by a smaller corporation mainly because of its size, while the larger
corporation may not be a better performer if we compare how much ER is made from
a unit cost of capital. Therefore, we need a ratio to demonstrate the corporation's
ability to generate profit based on its cost of capital. In this study, we use Return on
Invested Capital (ROIC) to represent after tax profit from operations and Weighted
Average Cost of Capital (WACC) for overall cost of capital, and calculate the spread
between these two rather than dollar ER as the measure of corporate performance.
We calculate a company's ER by using the exemplified method ER=total capital
*(ROIC-WACC). Here total capital is the total capital invested in the company (sum
of book value of equity and debt). Return on invested capital (ROIC) is estimated by
earnings divided by the value of capital. *
ROiC=- NOPL4T
Operating Invested Capital
NOPLAT is the Net Operating Profit Less Adjusted Taxes.** The weighted average
cost of capital (WACC) is the overall cost of the company's debt and equity, which is
calculated by dividing the overall costs by the total capital invested in the operation
(book value of debt plus preferred stock and common stock), such that
WACC = ^,Cost of Capital = Cost of Debt +cost of PrefStock + Cost of Common Stock
SCapital Stock Debt + PrefStock + Common Stock
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Note:
* Operating Invested Capital is defined asfollows:
OIC=Operating Working Capital (OWC) + net Plant, Property & Property & Equipment + Other
Assets + Other Liabilities + Value ofOperating Leases + Goodwill
Here, goodwill is not included in the calculation.
OWC = Operating Cash + Excess Marketable Securities + Accounts Receivable + Inventories +
Other current Assets(Less Excess Marketable securities) - Accounts Payable - Other Current
Liabilities
** NOPLAT= EBIT- Taxes on EBIT- Change in Deferred Taxes.
The three components of cost of capital are then weighted according tathe proportion that each
represents in the overall invested capital.
To calculate total capital stock or total capital invested we need to get the data for
total amount of debt, preferred shares, and common stock. To get the cost of capital,
we need to decide the interest expenses for debts (less tax shield effect of interest
deductibility); the cost of preferred stock, which is the preferred dividends paid to
preferred shareholders; and the cost of common stock, which is required rate of return
or opportunity cost to investors ofholding the stock.
The cost of a company's equity (common stock) is the estimated traditional capital
asset pricing model (CAPM), which utilizes the market return, risk free rate and the
risk factor that relates company stock return risk to general market return. The cost of
equity is defined as:
K = Rf + ß*(RM-Rf)
Here, K is the cost of equity (required rate of return to investors) of a company's
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common stock. Rm is the rate of return of the market index portfolio, Rf is the risk
free interest rate, and Beta represents the covariance of stock prices with the market
index price divided by the variance ofthat market index. Every variable is subject to
the time period being studied. This equation demonstrate that the company's cost of
equity is equal to the risk free rate plus the risk premium the company's share price
must provide to attract investors to buy it. The risk premium is calculated by
multiplying the risk premium that the general market must provide to attract investors
by the company's Beta which represents the risk (volatility) associated with the
company's share price to that of the market index portfolio.
C. Data and sample creation
i. Data:
We used CompuSTAT as the major data source for company financial data. If the data
is not available in CompuSTAT, we tried to get that in Bloomberg. Before download
the data, we match stock tickers listed in the CC(BE)2 score table against tickers in
both CompuSTAT and Bloomberg since each database uses different rules to name
tickers. We downloaded Bloomberg data manually using its overhead functions. We
used GICS (Global Industry Classification Standard) which is provided in the
CC(BE) index to represent the industry sector information of each company.
Standard & Poor's and MSCI Barra jointly developed the Global Industry
Classification Standard (GICS®) which establishes a common, global standard of
industry classifications for companies worldwide.
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ii. Sample creation:
The Clarkson Centre for Business Ethics & Board Effectiveness CC(BE)2 started to
produce Board Shareholder Confidence Index in the year 2003, during the same year
the famous SOX act was brought into effect. We chose the data from 2002-2006
which covered a year before the score was made and 3 years after it was made. We
tried to obtain the 2001 data for our study, but most of the data was not available in
both CompuSTAT and Bloomberg for that year. (We also tried other databases and
encountered the same situation). The 5-year period should reflect the effect of the
governance on the corporate performance. There were 211 firms in the 2003 CCBE
index group, after searching for data in CompuSTAT and Bloomberg, 196 companies
were selected; among the rest 15 companies, 9 were acquired by or merged with
others after 2003, one was delisted, four had no data for most of the variables we need
during 2002 to 2006, and one had no beta to calculate cost of equity. We used
Bloomberg overhead functions to calculate beta for companies if that was not
available in CompuSTAT. We also tried to get financial data from Bloomberg and
compare that with the data from CompuSTAT; however, the historical financial data
were not available for most variables in our model. Therefore, for the 1 96 firms, we
tried to get financial data from CompuSTAT to calculate ROIC and WACC; if for a
specific year the data was not available for a firm, we dropped that firm from the
sample ofthat year.
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Mergers and Acquisitions can have significant impacts on companies organizationally
and financially. In our study, M&A activities posed serious problems for the spread
calculation. It is because the ROIC uses the operating invested capital figures from the
beginning of a given year and compares them with earnings at year-end, M&A
activities can skew the results of ROIC calculation. An example of this phenomenon
can be found in Teck Comineo Limited (TEK/B), which merged during 2004 (all
figures in millions)
2003 2004 2005
EBITDA 394 1,275 2,077
Operating Invested Capital (Year Start) 3,822 4,106 6,157
Net Sales (Year End) 2,228 3,428 4,415
Thus, the merger boosted sales and earnings during 2004, but OIC was not affected
until 2005. For this study the purpose of ROIC calculations is to simulate the
investment activity that evaluate the firms at the beginning of the year, using
then-current WACC and examine ex post the results of the investment at the end of
the year. To counteract this effect, we used SDC database to check data for years and
firm combination where companies may have engaged in extensive merger activity. If
the reported data^was not adjusted for the M&A event, we dropped that firm from that
year.
In respect to industry regulations, some industries have regimes that require the price
of products or service to be within a specific range, rather than following the market
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price. For example, by checking company introduction materials, we found that all
utility firms in our sample are regulated companies, which means the price of
products and services are regulated by government to certain level and do not reflect
the market value of that products or services. Therefore, we could not use company
financial performance that did not reflect the market value of the company to measure
the performance of board of directors. Thus, we eliminated all utility companies from
the samples.
In addition, financial firms frequently exhibited near-zero or negative operating
capital, resulting in dramatic fluctuations for returns on invested capital. Accounting
valuations of assets, size of asset and liabilities relative to earnings and the
fluctuations in assets and liabilities can all lead to negative rates of return even when
earnings are positive; as a result, the return on invested capital could be negative or a
unreasonable high positive value (when earning is divided by positive but near zero
capital). This particular character of financial firms differentiates them from other
kinds of firms when calculating financial returns; therefore, we didn't include
financial firms in our sample. The distribution of the sample companies by industry
and year is shown in Table 1 (see appendix^
Hi. Spread Calculation
Once we calculated the value for ROIC and WACC, we generated a spread by
subtracting WACC from ROIC. Then we used the five one-year values of spread to
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derive the geometrie mean which would indicate to what extend the management
performance affected the financial performance of the company.
D. Data aggregation andAnalysis
196 companies were selected with adequate data for the 5-year series. Once the
companies were selected, we eliminated the utility companies that were regulated by
the government because their revenue could not reflect the market value of the
product or services they provided. Also, financial firms are removed due to the special
evaluation of their operating capital. Then we assigned each company to one of the 18
industrial groups. Here is the approach we used to derive company excess return
which also incorporated the consideration of the above two factors.
To calculate the excess return that a company achieved during a specific year, we
needed to consider two important factors which could largely affect the result. One
was the degree of industry concentration which explains to what extend the
performance of major companies in an industry can influence the general performance
of that industry. Another factor was the capitalization of the company which can also
influence the industry performance index with respect to the level of industry
concentration. The most straight forward measurement for these two factors is the size
of the company which is represented by total company assets.
The following formula was used to calculate the weighted average performance of a
company within the industry group it belongs to.
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S Assetsg¡{ROICsi - WACCj
Weighted Average Performance,, = —
SAssetsgi
1=1
Here we did our calculations in the following steps:
. Calculate the WACC and ROIC for each firm over the five year period
. Derive spread values for each firm for each year when there is a ROIC and
WACC value
Generate industry average spreads for each industry group and year from the
data on companies in this sample sorted by industry.
Generate differential spread values for each company for each year by
subtracting industry means from firm values.
. For each CCBE grade, find the weighted average differential spread where
the weight for each firm is that firm's percent of total assets of all firms with
that grade.
Generate geometric means for differential values for each CCBE2 grade over
the five-year period
IV. RESULTS
Company excess return by grade over 2002-2006 is shown in table 2, the 3D version
is shown in chart 1 (Appendix). The grades are assigned by CCBE2 according to the
performance scores based on Canadian Board Shareholder Confidence Index data.
Companies receiving an AAA+ or A grade achieved significant positive mean
differential spread over the five-year-period, which were 13% and 19%. However,
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companies receiving B grades performed more than 4% below their weighted average
industry peers during 4 out of the 5 yeas of the study, for a total difference of 18.75%.
Companies receiving C grades performed more than 6% better than B grade
companies during the 2002-2006 period but still 12.27% below the weighted industry
average over the 5-year-period. Companies receiving AA or AAA grades generated
negative mean differential spreads; however, on average that is still much higher than
performance achieved by companies receiving a B or C grade. For example, the
overall performance for AAA grade companies is 2.78% below the weighed industry
average level; however, it is 12% higher than that of B grade companies.
Table 3 (Appendix) shows the overall weighted excess return for companies which are
assigned A level grades and those which are assigned B or C grade. (Chart 2 shows
the 3D version of table 3). The A level companies outperformed non-? level
companies in each of the five years with differences ranging from 4.64% to 7.06%.
Over the five-year-period, A level companies performed 13.24% higher than their
weighted industry performance, while non-? level companies performed 16.39%
lower than their weighted industry average levels. The performance gap between well
and poorly governed firms is almost 30% of the return to investors.
To test the statistical significance of the observed difference, we established a
regression model to analyze the relationship between ER and corporate governance
performance. The test attempted to figure out whether other factors like industry and
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2002-2006 business cycle also have significant effects on excess return spread. The
null hypothesis is that in accounting for other factors, no relationship exists between
company ER performance and the shareholders' confidence level of board of
directors.
We used the same method for our assessment of average spread to derive the sample
for this analysis. We removed regulated utilities and financial firms from the sample,
and only included the combination of year and firm for years during witch a firm
operated. We also removed data for the years before or after which a particular firm
had aggressive M&A activities. We defined ER spread as the dependent variable and
then regressed it on the following set of (0, 1 ) independent variables:
Year: 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006
Industry: Energy; Materials; Capital Goods; Commercial Services & Supplies;
Transportation; Automobiles & Components; Consumer Durables & Apparel;
Consumer Services; Media; Retailing; Food & Staples Retailing; Food, Beverage
& Tobacco; Health Care Equipment & Services; Pharmaceuticals, Biotechnology
& Life Sciences; Software & Services; Technology Hardware & Equipment;
Semiconductors & Semiconductor Equipment.
CCBE2 grades: A, AA, AAA, AAA+, B, C
This specifies the form of the regression equation as follows:
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Company Excess Earnings = Constant + £ Coefficient. * Year
+V Coefficient. * Industry·,
+ V Coefficient. * Grade¡
The regression result is shown in table 4 (Appendix). The null hypothesis is that
CCBE2 grade does not affect a firm's economic value. Our results led to a rejection of
the null hypothesis in most cases since grades represent high shareholder confidence
level are associated with significantly greater excess return throughout the five year
period. In terms of CCBE2 governance performance grades, a C grade company's
excess return is 7% to 10% less than that of an A grade company per year on average.
This suggests that an active and productive board of director can guide the company
operation to achieve much higher cost efficiency which in turn significantly increases
a company's economic value and a shareholder's return on investment. We then ran
the regression again by assigning all companies into A level group if they received A,
AA, AAA or AAA+ CCBE2 grades and non-? level groups if they received B or C
grade. The result is shown in Table 5 (Appendix). In general, an A level grade
company generated returns 1 1% more than that of a company having B or C grade. In
both regression results we didn't find any statistical significance to support that
industry or the business cycle can affect the spreads, whereas all parameters of
variables representing company corporate governance performance were statistically
significant.
In order to better demonstrate the above results, consider the example of a typical firm
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in the model and the difference in performance associated with that firm having
"AAA+" level, as opposed to "C" level, governance. Firstly, we find the industry
which has near mean performance in the mode (Transportation); then construct a
simple example company with capitalization equal to that of the average of all firms
in that industry. The comparative performance during this period equals to the
difference in spread between that firm if it received "AAA+" grade from CCBE and
if it had received a "C" grade; this is shown in the first three rows in table 6
(Appendix). Then we multiply this percentage differences by the invested capital of
this example company to get the difference in dollar value for investors generated by
an "AAA+" company over a "C" company, which is CAD 1.704 billion. In table 7
(Appendix), we also present the scenario where the example company received "A"
grade to compare against the situation that if it received a "C" grade form CCBE .
The total difference in dollar value over the five year period is CAD 2.037 billion.
To gain the robustness of our result test we also tested for heteroscedasticity of the
independent variable and Fix /Random effect of the panel data. In statistics, a
sequence of random variables is heteroscedastic, or heteroskedastic, if the random
variables have different variances. Heteroscedasticity does not cause OLS coefficient
estimates to be biased nor inconsistent, but it can cause the variance (and, thus,
standard errors) of the coefficients to be underestimated. In our study Breusch-Pagan
test was used to test for heteroscedasticity in a linear regression model. It tests
whether the estimated variance of the residuals from a regression are dependent on the
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values of the independent variables. The null hypothesis is that the residuals are
homoskedastic. The test result is shown in table 8 (see Apendix). Breushch-Pagan test
follow the Chi-square distribution, and a high value of Chi-Square (or low ? value)
can let us reject the null hypothesis. According to our results, we could not reject the
null hypothesis since the ? values was very high (very close to 1); therefore, we
conclude that the model is homoscedasticity and the parameter estimates are reliable.
Since our sample has the character of panel data, we also tested the data for group
(fixed) and time series (random) effects. The fixed effect model examines group
differences in intercepts, assuming the same slopes and constant variance across
groups. The random effect model, by contrast, estimates variance components for
groups and error, assuming the same intercept and slopes. For example, in our sample,
the existence of fixed effect suggests that the spread estimation is significant different
among companies (groups), while existence of random effect suggests that the spread
estimation is significantly affected by year (time series). Fixed effects are tested by
the (incremental) F test, while random effects are examined by the Lagrange
Multiplier (LM) test (Breusch and Pagan 1980). Here the hypothesis for fixed effects
is that all coefficients for intercepts are the same, which suggests there is no fixed
effect. The test result is shown in table 9 (see Appendix). The null hypothesis was
rejected; therefore, the spread estimation was significantly affected by the difference
between companies. Since each company has a different CC(BE) score, we can say
that board efficiency has significant influence on corporate performance. For random
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effect test, we couldn't get the result for Hausman test; therefore we didn't include
any evidence to support the model.
V. CONCLUSION
In the last two decades, the board of directors has been an increasingly popular topic
for corporate governance researches. During this period, boards have become more
active and independent, aligning themselves more closely with shareholder interests.
We believe that active boards can cause an increase in corporate residual earnings,
ultimately for the benefit of shareholders. However, there have been intense debates
as to the extent to which active and independent boards have had such an effect on
corporate performance. Empirical studies attempted to validate a relationship between
independent boards and outstanding corporate performances have produced mixed
results. We believe that an active board should have positive impact in the
organization to boost earnings. To test this assumption, we designed a study based on
Canadian TSE 300 company data through a five-year-period. We used shareholder's
confidence level as the agency for board performance. The result of our test indicates
that high shareholder confidence generates improved corporate performance.
Since it is difficult to go into a board room to observe the activities ofboard members,
we have to look for alternative agencies for the evaluation of board performance. We
believe it is unrealistic to think that singular changes in board structure alone, without
accompanying new activist behavior, would affect corporate performance; therefore,
more factors should be considered to identify active boards. Using the CC(BE) index
score we have been able to measure board performance by capturing factors affecting
shareholders' confidence in the Boards' abilities to fulfill their duties. Firstly, we
37
tested whether higher CC(BE)2 score suggesting good board performance could be
associated with superior corporate performance. Then, we tested the statistical
significance of this relationship. Our results demonstrated a statistically significant
relationship between a board with high confidence level and superior corporate
performance as measured by earnings in excess of costs of capital over the industry
average. Corporations that received an "AAA+" or "A" CC(BE)2 corporate
governance grade performed significantly better in generating earnings in the test
period than other corporations in the sample. In general, corporations which received
A, AA, AAA or AAA+ grades performed significantly better than those received B or
C grades. Since a corporate can receive A level grades only if it has more than 75
points after calculations, it is reasonable to conclude that there exists a positive
relationship between shareholders confidence level of boards and corporate
performance.
To gain robustness for the results, we tested for heteroscedasticity of the dependent
variable and fixed/Random effects of the panel data. The test results let us draw the
conclusion that the regression mode is homosedastic with constant variance for the
estimation error; in addition, the existence of fixed effect of the panel data suggested
that companies with different shareholder confidence levels (CC(BE) score) have
significant differences in performance.
Our study did not attempt to prove the causation for the correlation between
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governance and performance. Moreover, we didn't find any research to provide proof
on this topic. Factors other than board performance such as business cycle, market
concentration and demand volatility could also affect corporate performance. Even so,
we still believe the corporate governance revolution has had demonstrable positive
effects on the earnings generated by operations of the large Canadian corporations
during the period covered by this study.
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APPENDIX
TABLE 1 DISTRIBUTION OF THE SAMPLE COMPANIES BY INDUSTRY AND YEAR
GICS Code Industry Group
Year




2010 Capital Goods 9
2020 Commercial Services & Supplies 3
2030 Transportation 4
2510 Automobiles & Components 4
2520 Consumer Durables & Apparel 3
2530 Consumer Services 1
2540 Media 9
2550 Retailing 4
3010 Food & Staples Retailing 9
3020 Food, Beverage & Tobacco 7
3510 Health Care Equipment & Services
3520 Pharmaceuticals, Biotechnology & Life Sciences 10
4510 Software & Services 3
4520 Technology Hardware & Equipment 2
4530 Semiconductors & Semiconductor Equipment 3













































































Total 142 153 154 148 127 724
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Table 2: CORPORATE VALUE-ADDED PERFORMANCE* GIVEN
________________________DIFFERENT CC(BE)2 SCORES
2002 - 2006, Weighted by Assets
Geometric
Mean
Grade 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2002-2006












































* Measured by Differential Spread. As described in text, differential spread is calculated by
subtracting company excess earning rate of return, weighted by company assets, from
industry average excess earnings.
Chart 1: CORPORATE VALUE-ADDED PERFORMANCE* GIVEN




















Table 3: CORPORATE VALUE-ADDED PERFORMANCE* GIVENA LEVEL OR NONE A LEVEL CC(BE)2 SCORES
______________2002 - 2006, Weighted by Assets
Geometric
Mean
Grade 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2002-2006
















* Measured by Differential Spread. As described in text, differential spread is calculated by
subtracting company excess earning rate of return, weighted by company assets, from
industry average excess earnings.
Chart 2: CORPORATE VALUE-ADDED PERFORMANCE* GIVEN























Table 4: REGRESSION RESULTS FOR SINGLE COMPANY ANNUAL
SPREAD VS. CC(BE)2 GRADES AND BOARD ACTIVITY
Parameter Standard
Estimate Error
t Value Pr > |t|
Intercept ß.??5 0.023 0.22 0.825
Energy -0.T14 0.020 -0.70 0.486
Materials -0.050 T.T18 -2.86 0.004
Capital Goods -0.027 0.029 -0.94 0.350
Commercial Services & Supplies -0.017 0.045 -0.37 0.710
Transportation -0.038 0.041 -0.93 0.352
Automobiles & Components -0.011 0.037 -0.29 0.769
Consumer Durables & Apparel 0.007 0.048 0.14 0.891
Consumer Services -0.055 0.087 -0.63 0.528
Media -0.016 T.027 -0.59 0.557
Retailing -0.014 T.038 -0.37 0.714
Food & Staples Retailing -T.T02 0.030 -0.08 0.935
Food, Beverage & Tobacco 0-013 0.033 0.39 0.700
Health Care Equipment & Services -0.017 0.097 -0.17 0.862
Pharmaceuticals, Biotechnology & Life Sciences -0.334 0.026 -12.71 <.0001
Software & Services -T.T09 ?-045 -T.20 T.843
Technology Hardware & Equipment -0.036 0.045 -0.80 0.422
Semiconductors & Semiconductor Equipment -0.047 0.045 -1.04 0.298
A 0.109 0.019 5.63 <.0001
AA 0.069 0.032 2.14 0.033
AAA 0.083 0.029 2.89 0.004
AAA+ 0.070 T-026 2.73 0.006
B -0.017 0.019 -0-93 0.352
2002 -0.010 0.018 -0.54 0.588
2003 0.004 0.018 0.21 0.835
2004 -0.003 0.018 -0.18 0.859
2005 -0.008 0.018 -0.46 0.648
tf(adj.X%)
F Value




Notes: Sample size=724. All parameter estimates are percentage.




Table 5: REGRESSION RESULTS FOR SINGLE COMPANY ANNUAL












Commercial Services & Supplies - ? . 007
Transportation -T.038
Automobiles & Components -0.007
Consumer Durables & Apparel T.0T9
Consumer Services -0 . T79
Media -0.011
Retailing -0.013
Food & Staples Retailing ? . 002
Food, Beverage & Tobacco 0 . 024
Health Care Equipment & Services -T.TT1
Pharmaceuticals, Biotechnology & Life Sciences - 0 . 333
Software & Services - 0 . 021
Technology Hardware & Equipment - ? . 030


















































































Notes: Sample size=724. All parameter estimates are percentage.
Base Industry: Telecomm service Base Grade: C Base Year: 2006
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Table 6
COMPARE GAINS FOR INVESTORS IN THE BETTER VERSUS WORSE GOVERNED
STYLIZED COMPANY
(AAA+ VS C)
(SPREAD IN PERCENTAGES; CAPITAL AND RETURNS PROFIT IN $MM)
Total
Spread AAA+ Stylized Firm
C Stylized Firm
Difference
Avg Capital for that firm
Excess Return "AAA+" Fimi
Excess Return "C" Firm
Difference in Investor Return
02 03 04 05 06
0.94% 2.38% 2.92% 2.63% 3.49% 12.36%
-0.48% -2.59% -2.86% -3.32% -3.64% -12.89%
1.41% 4.97% 5.78% 5.96% 7.13% 25.25%
5,079 5,201 5,601 7,666 8,326 6,375
48 124 164 202 290 827
-24 -135 -160 -255 -303 -877
72 258 324 457 594 1,704
Table 7
COMPARE GAINS FOR INVESTORS IN THE BETTER VERSUS WORSE GOVERNED
STYLIZED COMPANY
(AVSC)
(SPREAD IN PERCENTAGES; CAPITAL AND RETURNS PROFIT IN $MM)
Total02 03 04 05 06
Spread A stylized Firm
C Stylized Firm
Difference
Avg Capital for that firm
Excess Return "A" Firm
Excess Return "C" Firm










































Breusch-Pagan test for Heteroscedasticity (Dependent variable: Spread)
















F Test for No Fixed Effects
Test on all CC(BE)2 grades Test on A level / Non A level CC(BE) grades
NumDF Den DF F Value Pr>F NumDF Den DF F Value Pr>F
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